European vote: resounding ‘no’ to ideologies of the elites

The results of the European Parliament elections are clear and unequivocal. Despite the differences, some appreciable, between one country and another, the general picture is that of a decisive swing to the right, with the strengthening of the EPP (European People’s Party) Identity and Democracy and Conservatives and Reformists groups, the collapse of the liberal-centrists of Renew Europe and the Greens, with only the Socialists holding on to the left.

If one then looks at the major issues on which the electoral campaign was mainly hinged and the distribution of successes and failures in the respective countries, the victory of the right-wing takes on a very precise meaning, equally unequivocal, unless one wants to pretend not to see it. Voters in the countries that make up the Union used the vote to express a resounding rejection of all the main political agendas supported by the continental ruling class in the Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen and in the Council, and by the political axis between Emmanuel Macron's France and Helmudt Scholz's Germany; against the abstract and ideological root of those agendas; against the top-down method with which they tried to impose on European citizens, and to demonise and censure anyone who disagreed with them.

In particular, the voters expressed their rejection of the radical ‘green’ policy based on the unrealistic and extremely costly objective of eliminating fossil energy sources, on the forced and equally unrealistic electrification of the automotive sector that destroys the continental industry to benefit only China, on the absurd obligations to adapt houses and buildings, with unsustainable disbursements for owners, to totally arbitrary criteria of ‘neutrality’ of CO2 emissions.

They said a resounding ‘no’ to a similarly ideologised policy on immigration, still stubbornly hinging on the priority of ‘reception’ and on the dogmas of cultural relativism, indifferent to the justified fears of the native populations and to the ever-increasing risks to security, liveability, and coexistence according to the principles of Western civilisation.

They also said no - although few emphasised it - to the overwhelming power of the LGBT agenda in EU policies and to the reduction of civil rights to pandering to the power demands of overbearing minorities to the detriment of the weakest, with the corresponding mortification of the family, of motherhood and fatherhood, of the protection of life and childhood. Finally, they expressed their clear rejection of a polarisation in foreign policy and an exacerbation in the clash with Russia over the Ukrainian conflict, even to the concrete, unprecedented evocation of a possible involvement of EU countries in direct war.

This last, specific significance of the vote is denied or downplayed by some commentators sympathetic to the outgoing EU establishment, with the argument that the right-wing groupings that have increased their consensus, with limited exceptions (the German Advanced format Drive) hold positions on this issue that are anything but sympathetic to Putin (contrary to the alarmist representation of the ‘ultra-right’ insistently put forward by the continental progressive media). But it is impossible not to link precisely the resounding success of AfD, the corresponding collapse of the German social democrats and liberals, and the authentic débacle of Macron's Renaissance party, doubled by Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National in France, to the fact that it was precisely Macron and the Scholz government that had expressed the most aggressive, ‘muscular’ and militarist (in the case of the French president to the limits of the grotesque) positions against Russia.

Now, it should of course be emphasised (and it has already been emphasised extensively by many analysts, hopeful for the permanence of the status quo at the top of the Union) that the limpid political success of the conservative, sovereignist right-wing Euro-realist right-wingers cannot at present be translated in arithmetical terms into a reversal of the ‘majority’ in the European Parliament (insofar as this term can have a technical meaning in an institution such as this, which is not endowed with legislative power), since the ‘Ursula’ coalition (Populars, Renew Europe, Socialists and Greens) formally still has the majority of votes in the assembly. Nonetheless, the political fact of the results, in a complex system of checks and balances like that of the EU institutions, is much more important than the abstractly numerical one, and can strongly interfere with it.

If the parties of the ‘Ursula' majority do not take into account the message sent by the voters, and do not open a concrete dialogue with the right-wing forces (in which the two groups of Id and the Conservatives are moving towards increasing coordination, if not unification) on the main dossiers, they will assume an enormous responsibility, create a radical polarisation over which they do not have the weapons to govern (especially in the EPP group, where conservative positions are increasingly influential) and may face very unpleasant surprises. Beginning with the investiture of the next President of the Commission: remembering that already in the previous term that started in 2019, despite the predicted majority being much more solid, Ursula von der Leyen, crippled by a large number of ‘traitors within the ranks’, prevailed only thanks to the ‘rescue’ of 11 MEPs from the Italian 5 Star Movement. Now the situation is much more uncertain, the EPP is much more inclined to the right, and in addition the ‘non-aligned’ have exceeded 100 members, and are a mysterious reservoir from which unpredictable results could emerge.

The all too timely and bold statements by von der Leyen, who sang victory for ‘her’ coalition, despite the inescapable indications of the vote, and bet on its continuity, are more a demonstration of perceived weakness than a sign of strength, and an attempt to anticipate ‘counter-attacks’ by her opponents. As is Macron's hasty decision to dissolve the French National Assembly, challenging Le Pen to single combat and hoping for the usual ‘holy union’ reflex of French progressives and liberals against the bogeyman of the ‘barbaric invasion’ of the right. We will see whether their line will be shared by the other components of the European centre-left ‘bloc’, or whether a healthy process of rethinking and dialogue will finally open within it, with the substantial correction of the governance of the EU.